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In a pre-election debate in October 2008, Senator McCain pointed 
out several times that Senator Obama had once said that he 
intended to “spread the wealth” through his proposed tax policies. 
McCain clearly did not mean this observation to be a compliment 
or an incentive for voters to prefer his rival; his repetition of the 
phrase and sarcastic tone of voice conveyed McCain’s conviction 
that “spreading the wealth” is a goal that most Americans abhor.  
That conviction is especially striking given that it came during a 
period of several weeks in which the stock market plummeted, 
housing foreclosures and the unemployment rate rose, banks 
denied credit to small businesses, the ex-CEO of the bankrupt 
Lehman Brothers firm defended being paid hundreds of millions of 
dollars in recent years, and a story in the AARP newsletter featured 
several middle class women sleeping in their cars before going to 
work each day.  So, do Americans oppose spreading the wealth? If 
so why -- do they think that they would lose some of their own 
wealth, or that those other people whose wealth would be spread 
around really deserve to keep it, or what? 
 
The outcome of the presidential election in November 2008 
suggests that a majority of American voters do not oppose the idea 
of spreading the wealth, or at least do not oppose it so much that 
they will vote against a candidate who purportedly endorses such a 
policy.   But it’s hard to find evidence that they support it.  Larry 
Bartels’ stunning new book, Unequal Democracy, helps us to understand the complexities of Americans’ views and practices 
with regard to economic redistribution through its exposition of 
essential evidence, its historical perspective, and his telling 
observations and analyses.  The book is exemplary throughout in 
its transparency with regard to the data and Bartels’ analytic 
strategy for using them, in its attention to alternative explanations 
for a given outcome, and in its balance between not over-reaching 
and asserting a clear, controversial, important thesis.   
 
Bartels begins by documenting rising income inequality and static 
or declining class mobility in the United States over the past few 
decades. He shows that, contrary to most economic analyses of 
rising inequality, “the most important single influence on the 
changing U.S. income distribution over the past half century [“may 
be”] the contrasting policy choices of Democratic and Republican 
presidents” (p. 30).   Since World War II, periods with Democratic 
presidents have seen less unemployment, more overall economic 
growth, and greater income growth for the middle class and 
especially the working poor, than have periods with Republican 
presidents.  And yet, a Republican has won the presidency more 
often than has a Democrat since 1970, when the rise in income 
inequality began.   
 
After refuting the claim that this anomaly results from poor voters’ 
preference for conservative social policies over liberal economic 
policies, Bartels explains it in several ways.  The explanations 
include the fact that voters are myopic and strangely blinkered, that 
Republican presidents – by luck or skill—are better situated to take 
advantage of voters’ poor eyesight, and campaign spending by the 
wealthy skews electoral contests.  Voters hold egalitarian views in 
general, many perceive rising inequality and think it is unfair – but 
nevertheless “genuine allegiance to the ideal of equality may 
comfortably coexist with fervent support for policies that 
exacerbate inequality” (pp. 129-30).  Unequal Democracy shows why; I propose to leave it to readers to discover the reasons on 
their own. 
 
Finally, Bartels provides detailed case studies of the huge 
upwardly redistributive tax cuts of 2001 and 2003, the (temporary) 
abolition of the estate tax, and the continuing erosion of the 
minimum wage. Each case analyzes the policy, shows how the 
public viewed it and why, describes how political elites acted, and 
ties all of the evidence into broad arguments about the United 
States’ unequal democracy. Each case study is full of evidence, 
insights, and surprises.  
 
In addition to these important specific analyses, Unequal 
Democracy implicitly or explicitly challenges a wide array of 
assumptions or assertions within and outside the academy.  Bartels 
argues that:  
 
•  Economic inequality matters (compare Richard Fuld and 
Barbara Harvey, resident of her car 
[http://bulletin.aarp.org/yourmoney/personalfinance/articles/n
o_place_to_call_home.html]).  Political scientists should pay 
more attention to it; more generally, even the most elite 
scholars can and should engage with substantive topics and 
policies that affect peoples’ lives.  The study of processes or 
institutions, and the production of more rigorous causal 
models or more sophisticated methodological innovations 
need not be our highest academic priority. 
 
•  Economic inequality is partly caused by governmental 
actions. That point may not surprise political scientists but it 
is largely ignored by economists and sociologists, who 
frequently speak to each other’s disciplines but seldom 
engage with politics. 
 •  The details of policy choices matter, and they can be 
analyzed rigorously and theoretically.  That point too might 
seem self-evident to many people, but political scientists 
have largely eschewed the focused study of substantive 
policies in favor of more “important,” “generalizable,” or 
“theoretical” subjects.  
 
•  Whether Democrats or Republicans control the federal 
government affects the level and trajectory of economic 
inequality. That point will not surprise party loyalists, but it 
is disputed by radicals of all types, proponents of third 
parties, and (implicitly) citizens who eschew voting because 
they think it makes no difference which party wins.  
 
•  Low-income Americans have not given up class voting for 
the sake of culture wars; arguably the well-off are less likely 
to vote their economic interests than are the badly-off. That 
point will not surprise party operatives, but it is not well 
recognized by many elites who fear that working-class whites 
are snookered into supporting the Republican party because 
of racism, nativism, or religious conservatism.   
 
•  The median voter theorem is wrong, at least for important 
economic policies of the past decade.  That point directly 
challenges a lot of literature within political science that is 
arguably too complacent about the workings of the United 
States’ supposed democracy.  Public opinion does little to 
shape economic or tax policies, even when the policies 
involve trillions of dollars and affect almost all Americans’ 
lives. (I would add the same point with regard to other issues 
– the public is more conservative than American policies on 
immigration and teaching creationism, but more liberal than 
policies on gun control and some forms of regulation).  
 •  The divide between behavioralism and institutionalism 
within the Americanist wing of political science is silly and 
unproductive (my words, not Bartels’).  The impact of public 
opinion depends largely on its relationship to institutional 
practice and change; the value of institutions in a purported 
democracy depends largely on their responsiveness to public 
preferences. 
 
•  On average, citizens with more political knowledge do not 
have more coherent or sensible policy views, given their 
expressed interests, than do citizens with less political 
knowledge.  Extrapolating, one might argue that having a 
more generally knowledgeable citizenry or teaching people 
more about policy choices that confront the nation will not 
generate better or more responsive outcomes.  That 
conclusion violates a key assumption of democratic theory 
and the rhetoric of most news media and politicians – as well 
as challenging the bedrock motivation of those of us who 
teach politics for a living. 
 
•  Interest groups have little demonstrable impact on at least 
some important policies, including tax policy. That 
conclusion will surprise the author of The Politics of Gucci 
Gulch, and the many writers who have claimed to trace the 
financial and informational influence of interest groups on 
particular members of Congress.  Members of Congress may 
be gratified by this argument, but not by the one that 
immediately follows it: the real driver of many policy choices 
is “elite ideology.” 
 
In short, Bartels is not only making a substantive argument about 
nothing less than the nature of the American polity and economy, 
but he is also challenging political scientists on a number of fronts 
that are more parochial but just as important within the discipline.  
He may not always succeed – if public opinion doesn’t matter, why does he devote several chapters to it?  Would the analysis be 
different if Bartels or another author had chosen three different 
cases to examine?  Just how do campaign contributions create 
lopsided electoral outcomes? – but the book is never less than 
provocative and is often revelatory. 
 
Let me return to the substantive issues in Unequal Democracy with 
which this essay started.  Does this book – in conjunction with 
other recent works such as Jacob Hacker’s The Great Risk Shift, 
Lawrence Jacobs and Theda Skocpol’s edited Inequality and 
American Democracy, Nolan McCarty et al.’s Polarized America, 
and Pablo Beramendi and Christopher Anderson’s Democracy, 
Inequality, and Representation, among others – signal a shift in 
scholars’ attention to the central axes of inequality?  In several 
social sciences, concerns about race and gender have totally 
swamped concerns about class over the past few decades.  (That 
has been less evident in political science, if only because most 
members of the most prominent departments have generally 
ignored all elements of what some have called the “holy trinity” of 
race, class, and gender.)  But the wheel of the issue attention cycle 
may be turning; as Wall Street melts and Main Street loses its 
home, perhaps students will once again want to read Theodore 
Roosevelt’s denunciation of “malefactors of great wealth” and 
faculty will once again teach Karl Marx and John Gaventa. 
 
Bartels is an unlikely guide back to the study of class politics; he 
has been an “unusually apolitical political scientist.  (The last time 
I voted was in 1984, … for Ronald Reagan.)” (p. ix).  But whether 
lured by funding from the Russell Sage Foundation or simple 
concern about the trajectory of American politics in the 1990s, 
Bartels took up the vexed question of the relationships between 
presumed political equality and demonstrable economic inequality.
∗  If he and the authors mentioned above are bellwethers, 
we may now be in the promising situation of increasing attention 
by political scientists to the politics of economic inequality just 
when American voters are turning away from economic 
conservatism and toward greater political liberalism and economic 
redistribution (“spreading the wealth”).  
 
It seems to be easier to focus on only one axis of the holy trinity of 
race, class, and gender rather than several.  Bartels never mentions 
gender and discusses race only once, briefly. Verba, Schlozman, 
and Brady found race to be unimportant as an explanation for 
unequal political influence in Voice and Equality, and gender 
mattered relatively little (although they went on to write a book on 
gender and politics, with Nancy Burns).  Hacker pays some 
attention to gender but almost none to race; McCarty et al. focus 
some on race and a lot of immigration, but give little notice to 
gender. Conversely, most scholars of racial politics in the United 
States argue that class matters little in identity or vote choice; few 
attend to gender concerns.  And scholars of gender or sexuality 
engage in furious internecine debates about how much attention 
they do and should pay to racial divides, with an occasional glance 
at economic divisions.  
 
Perhaps analysts’ newly revived focus on class should do more to 
address the intersection of two or more axes of inequality rather 
than allowing one to predominate.  This is hardly a new point.  
Alberto Alesina and Edward Glaeser point to racial division as a 
key explanation for the United States’ anemic welfare state in 
Fighting Poverty in the US and Europe; Ira Katznelson, Suzanne 
Mettler, Claudine Gay, Ange-Marie Hancock, and Rodney Hero all 
make the interaction of race or gender and class the centerpiece of 
their work.  In a year in which a woman almost became a 
                                                 
∗ Truth in advertising: while I was on RSF’s Board of Trustees, I voted several times to 
support Bartels and his colleagues in the Social Dimensions of Inequality project.   
 presidential candidate, and at a moment when a man understood to 
be black has just been elected president, it becomes all the more 
urgent for political scientists to analyze the multiple dimensions 
along which our democracy is becoming more, or less, unequal.  
For example, I predict that the divide between working class and 
affluent blacks (especially women) on the one hand, and deeply 
poor blacks (especially men) on the other hand, will grow worse, 
even as racial inequality overall is lessening. We can only hope 
that Larry Bartels will turn his extraordinary intelligence and 
analytic sophistication toward illuminating the politics of 
intersectional inequality in the same way that he has illuminated 
the politics of economic inequality.  
 
 
 